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1Abstract
This paper examines an informed principal-agent game with ex post participation
constraints for the agent. It shows that the players do not lose by communicating in
turn among themselves rather than simultaneously if and only if the principal com-
municates ¯rst. It then considers every Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
that assign nonnegative payo®s for one player in a bilateral asymmetric information
framework. It provides necessary and su±cient conditions for sequential communica-
tion to be as e±cient as simultaneous communication in implementing these allocation
rules when the player with unbounded payo®s moves ¯rst.
Key words: asymmetric information, principal-agent, implementation, contract the-
ory.
JEL codes: D23, D82.
21 Introduction
Consider two agents. They have to select a decision through a mechanism. Preferences
are private information. Side-payments are allowed. One of the two agents has limited
liability. Which mechanism should they use? According to the Revelation Principal, no
mechanism Pareto dominates (in term of ex ante payo®s) a direct revelation mechanism.
It prescribes that the agents simultaneously send a message (about preferences) to an
arbitrator who then selects a decision (with a side-payment). This paper investigates
whether simultaneous communication can be replaced by sequential communication (in
which agents communicate in turn among themselves) in direct revelation mechanisms and
what such a sequential mechanism look like.
The agents might be the members of an organization who decide on a project size. Or
two ¯rms, a producer and a retailer, that contract on production levels and prices. In those
examples, the agents are free to quit the organization or to exit the contract, anytime (e.g.
by going bankrupt). They are protected by limited liability. Payo®s must therefore be
non-negative to insure participation.1 Furthermore, by de¯ning who decides ¯rst on what,
the hierarchical structure in organizations, or the assignment of decision rights in contracts
speci¯es a particular sequence of moves. This paper rationalizes the use of a sequential
decision-making process. It also say something about its design.
With simultaneous communication, the allocations implemented (decisions and side-
payments) must be Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) for both agents. In contrast,
with sequential communication, they must satisfy the stronger dominant strategy incentive
compatible (DSIC) condition for the agent who communicates last. The paper provides
necessary and su±cient conditions for which the DSIC condition for the agent who has
limited liability can be obtained for free (in term of expected payo®s). Since, as argued
by Cr¶ emer and Riordan [1], the DSIC condition has simpler informational and computa-
tional requirements, a sequential mechanism is particularly appropriate for dealing with
less informed or rationally bounded agents.
The ¯rst part of the paper focuses on the allocations implemented if one player, the
1See Sappington [8] for a discussion on the limited liability assumption in the principal-agent model.
3\principal", makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract o®er to the other player, the \agent",
whose outside option is nil. It shows that simultaneous communication can be replaced by
sequential communication if and only if the principal communicates ¯rst. This result also
holds if the principal has bounded payo®s.
The second part considers all allocation rules that are BIC for both partners and satisfy
the ex post participation constraints for one.2 It provides necessary and su±cient conditions
for which the stronger DSIC condition for the ex post participation constrained partner
can be obtained for free. It therefore yields su±cient conditions for the use of sequential
mechanisms in place of simultaneous mechanisms while leaving the two partners' expected
utility unchanged.
The ¯rst part builds on Maskin and Tirole [5]. They show that the principal does
not lose by revealing her type before the agent does, thereby imposing the stronger DSIC
condition on the agent.3 These authors impose individual rationality at the interim stage
but not ex post. Here I take the argument one step further by showing that (i) the result
also holds when participation is an issue ex post, and (ii) in this case, the sequence of
communication matters: the principal can communicate ¯rst but not last. In other words,
imposing the DSIC condition in place of the BIC condition on the principal reduces her ex
ante payo®s.
The second part is related to literature on the implementation of Bayesian mechanisms
with quasi-linear preferences. Mookherjee and Reichelstein [7] show that, under su±cient
conditions, the BIC constraints can be replaced by the DSIC constraints for all agents
while leaving unchanged every agent's expected payo®. Yet this requires alterations to
side-payments which a®ects payo®s. The present paper shows that, on the one hand, some
agent's payo®s might be negative. The DSIC condition might therefore not be compatible
with ex post participation constraints.4 On the other hand, with only two players, one
2I.e. not necessarily the ones that emerge from an ex ante negotiation with extreme bargaining powers.
3To be precise, Maskin and Tirole show that, in their adverse selection model but with quasi-linear
preferences, the informed principal does not loose by revealing her type to the agent at the contracting
stage, thereby moving incentive compatibility constraints from the interim to the ex post stage (Proposition
11 in their paper).
4Proposition 1 shows that this is indeed the case for the allocation implemented in the informed principal-
4being ex post participation constrained, BIC for all can be replaced by BIC for one agent
and DSIC for the other.5
Cr¶ emer and Riordan [1] show that, under su±cient conditions, BIC for all can be
replaced by BIC for one agent and DSIC for the others. However, they do not address
the participation or individual rationality issue.6 Here, I show that (i) this result might
also hold with two agents when participation is an issue ex post for one agent; and (ii) it
matters who is DSIC constrained and who is BIC constrained.
2 Model and de¯nitions
Take two agents, hereafter called \players", a principal P (\she") and an agent A (\he").
Each player i = P;A has preferences ui(y;µi) over a common decision y 2 Y µ R and
private information µi 2 [µi; ¹ µi] ´ £i, with µi < ¹ µi. µi is referred as i's type. It is common-
knowledge that µP and µA are independently distributed according to the density fi(µi) > 0
for every µi 2 £i and cumulative Fi(µi) for i = P;A. The function ui is assumed thrice
continuously di®erentiable, concave in y, and increasing in µi. I make the assumption





Players perform transfers among themselves. The net transfer (possibly negative) from
the principal to the agent is denoted t. An allocation is a vector (y;t). The principal P and
the agent A's payo®s with the allocation (y;t) in state (µP;µA) 2 £P ££A are, respectively:
UP(y;t;µP) ´ uP(y;µP) ¡ t;
agent game.
5Proposition 2 provides the conditions for which BIC for all can be replaced by BIC for one partner and
DSIC for the other.
6In particular, they focus on the Bayesian implementation of the ¯rst-best levels of public good which
might not be compatible with the agents' participation condition (see, e.g., Example 23.E.1. in Mas-Colell
et al. [4]).
7This condition ensures that a solution derived by recognizing only the \local" incentive constraints will
also be globally incentive compatible.
5and,
UA(y;t;µA) ´ uA(y;µA) + t:
A state of nature is a vector µ = (µP;µA) 2 £P £ £A ´ £. The ¯rst component of µ is
the principal's private information while the second is the agent's one. The (total) surplus
or pro¯t in state µ is:
¼(y;µ) = UP(y;t;µP) + UA(y;t;µA) = uP(y;µP) + uA(y;µA): (1)
It is assumed to be non-negative, strictly concave and increasing up to its maximum y¤(µ) 2
Y de¯ned by the only value satisfying @¼
@y(y¤(µ);µ) = 0. Given the above assumptions, the
pro¯t ¼ and the marginal pro¯t @¼
@y are both increasing with µi for i = P;A.
Examples of such functions include ¯rm's pro¯ts, production costs, revenues from mar-
keting a product, as well as utility functions (e.g. bene¯ts from consuming a level of public
good y). For instance, uP(y;µP) might stand for the revenue from marketing y units with
a demand level µP (e.g. uP(y;µP) = (µP ¡y)y) or a price µP (then uP(y;µP) = µPy) while
uA(y;µA) = ¡c(y;µA) where c is a production cost function with marginal cost decreasing
with µA.
Three stages can be de¯ned to evaluate player's payo®s: ex ante, before players have
received any private information; interim, when each player i has received his or her pri-
vate information µi but does not know the other's information; ex post, when the state
µ is public. The corresponding ex ante, interim and ex post payo®s are, respectively,
Eµ[Ui(y(µi;µj);t(µi;µj);µi)], Eµj[Ui(y(µi;µj);t(µi;µj);µi)], and Ui(y(µi;µj);t(µi;µj);µi) for
i = P;A, j 6= i.8
An allocation rule fy(µ);t(µ)g is a menu of allocations (y(µ);t(µ)) contingent on each
state of nature µ 2 £.








8The terminology is similar to HolmstrÄ om and Maskin [3]. Eµj (Eµ) denotes the expectation operator
over µj (µ).
6for every µi 2 £i, µj 2 £j, and for j 6= i.
De¯nition 2 The allocation rule fy(µ);t(µ)g is dominant strategy incentive-compatible




for every µi 2 £i, µj 2 £j, and for j 6= i.
The conditions in De¯nition 1 (De¯nition 2) are the standard incentive-compatible con-
straints that allocation rules must satisfy in any direct revelation mechanism in a Bayesian
(dominant) strategy equilibrium. Bayesian incentive-compatibility (dominant strategy
incentive-compatibility) requires that truthful reporting of private information maximizes
the player's interim (ex post) payo®. Of course, dominant strategy incentive-compatibility
is a stronger requirement in the sense that any DSIC allocation rule is BIC for i but the
reverse is not necessarily true.
In the rest of the paper I will often use the following equivalent formulations of Bayesian
incentive-compatibility and dominant strategy incentive compatibility.
Lemma 1 The allocation rule fy(µ);t(µ)g is BIC for i if and only if:
(i) Eµj[y(:;µj)] is non-decreasing,















for every µi 2 £i, µj 2 £j, and for j 6= i.
Lemma 2 The allocation rule fy(µ);t(µ)g is DSIC for i if and only if:













7for every µi 2 £i, µj 2 £j, and for j 6= i.
Lemmata 1 and 2 set out well-known results in mechanism design, mostly due to Mirrless
[6], in the context of the present model. Formal proofs can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole
[2] and Mas-Colell et al. [4]. Although the second conditions in the above lemma appear
somewhat complex, they have a straightforward interpretation. Condition (ii) in Lemma
1 (Lemma 2) breaks down i's interim (ex post) payo® into two terms. The second term
(b) is i's interim (ex post) payo® when of type µi. The ¯rst term (a) is the incremental
interim (ex post) bene¯t of a higher type µi > µi. Condition (ii) stipulates that i must
receive exactly the incremental bene¯t of reporting truthfully µi.
De¯nition 3 The allocation rule fy(µ);t(µ)g satis¯es ex post participation (or limited
liability) for i if and only if i's ex post payo®s are non-negative, i.e. Ui(y(µ);t(µ);µi) ¸
0 for every µ 2 £.
A limited-liability incentive rule is an allocation rule that is BIC for both players and
satis¯es ex post participation for the agent. This paper examines the equivalent imple-
mentation of incentive allocation rules with sequential communication in the sense de¯ned
below.
De¯nition 4 A limited-liability incentive rule can equivalently be implemented in a se-
quential mechanism (or with sequential communication) in which i communicates ¯rst if
there exists an allocation rule which is:
(i) BIC for i,
(ii) DSIC for j 6= i,
(iii) It satis¯es the agent's ex-post participation constraints,
(iv) It yields the same ex ante payo® to both players as does the limited-liability incentive
rule.
To be equivalently implemented in a sequential mechanism, a limited-liability incentive rule
must satisfy the stronger requirement of dominant strategy incentive-compatibility for one
8player. The sequence of communication determines the identity of this player. Once i has
communicated her or his type honestly, j 6= i selects her or his reporting strategy under
perfect information. Therefore, j's incentive-compatible constraints must be satis¯ed ex
post in every state of nature, i.e., in dominant strategy.
I ¯rst focus on speci¯c limited-liability incentive rules: those that are implemented in
the informed principal-agent game de¯ned in the next section. I consider all limited-liability
incentive rules in Section 4.
3 Sequential communication in the informed principal-agent
game
Consider the following benchmark game. Suppose that the principal makes an ex ante
take-it-or-leave-it limited-liability incentive rule o®er fy(µ);t(µ)g to the agent. If it is
refused, each player gets zero. If it is accepted, the game proceeds. Each player i privately
observes µi. Players simultaneously send direct messages ^ µi which select a single allocation
(y(^ µP; ^ µA);t(^ µP; ^ µA)) in the limited-liability incentive rule.
The limited-liability incentive rules implemented in a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium of the benchmark game, denoted fyP(µ);tP(µ)g, are those that maximize the princi-
pal's ex ante payo®. Although several transfer rules ftP(µ)g can be a solution, the decision
rule fyP(µ)g is unique and easy to characterize under some assumptions. To do that, we
need ¯rst to ¯nd out the agent's ex ante payo®. From (ii) in Lemma 1, taking expectation

























9The agent's ex ante payo® is broken down into two terms. The ¯rst term (a) is his ex-
pected informational rent. It is the minimal amount that provides him with incentives to
communicate truthfully. The second term (b) is the agent of type µA's interim payo®. The
principal sets this term equal to zero to maximize her ex ante payo® while satisfying the
BIC and ex post participation constraints. Therefore, the agent's ex ante payo® is just (a).




(y;µA) so that the agent's ex
ante payo® becomes Eµ[rA(y(µP;µA);µA)]. Due to (1), the principal's ex ante payo® is
Eµ[¼(y(µP;µA);(µP;µA)) ¡ rA(y(µP;µA);µA)]: (2)
The decision rule implemented fyP(µ)g maximizes (2). Under some assumptions (speci¯ed






(yP(µP;µA);µA) = 0; (3)
for all (µP;µA) 2 £. The decision scheme fyP(µ)g solves a trade-o® between maximizing
the total surplus and minimizing the agent's informational rent. As a consequence, except
\at the top" (for the agent), decisions are distorted downward: yP(µP;µA) < y¤(µP;µA)





Totally di®erentiating (3) with respect to µA shows that the requirement of yP(µP;:) non-















P(µP;µA);µA) · 0 for every (µP;µA) 2 £ which ensures that
y
P(µP;:) is increasing for all µP. (A1) and (A2) and the concavity of ¼(:;µ) imply that y
P(:;µA) is increasing.
10Assumption (A4) states that the \hazard rate" fA(µA)
1 ¡ FA(µA) is non-decreasing. It is satis¯ed
for instance if the density fA is non-decreasing. Assumptions (A1) to (A4) are standard in
mechanism design (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole [2], Chapter 7). Armed with those assump-
tions, we set out a ¯rst result.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions (A1) to (A4), the limited-liability incentive rule imple-
mented in the informed principal-agent game is equivalently implementable in a sequential
mechanism if and only if the principal communicates ¯rst.
Proof (If part) Consider the following transfer scheme:











(yP(µP;x);x)dx. First, since it is non-
negative for every µ 2 £, then the ex post participation constraints hold. Second, by
construction it satis¯es condition (ii) in Lemma 2. Moreover, since yP(µP;:) is non-
decreasing for every µP 2 £P, then condition (i) in Lemma 2 is also satis¯ed and, there-
fore, the agent's DSIC constraints hold. The above transfer scheme yields to the principal
EµA[UP(yP(µP;µA);~ t(µP;µA);µP)] = EµA[¼(yP(µP;µA);(µP;µA)) ¡ rA(yP(µP;µA);µA)] at
the interim stage. Since yP(µP;µA) maximizes ¼(y(µP;µA);(µP;µA))¡rA(y(µP;µA);µA) for
every (µP;µA) 2 £, then µP maximizes EµA[¼(yP(^ µP;µA);(µP;µA)) ¡ rA(yP(^ µP;µA);µA)]
with respect to ^ µP and, therefore, the allocation rule fyP(µ);~ t(µ)g is BIC for the principal.
(Only if part) First, I show that any allocation rule that equivalently implements
fyP(µ);tP(µ)g must assign zero ex post payo®s to the agent of type µA. Suppose it is
not the case. Suppose that an allocation rule that equivalently implements fyP(µ);tP(µ)g
assigns a strictly positive ex post payo® to the agent in say state (µ0
P;µA). Then, due to
the ex post participation constraints, the agent of type µA's interim payo® is also strictly
positive. Using the de¯nition of the BIC conditions for the agent in Lemma 1, applying
the expectation operator on µA and integrating by parts as before, shows that the agent's
ex ante payo® is then strictly higher than Eµ[rA(y(µ);µA)]. Therefore, ex ante, the princi-
pal obtains strictly less than the maximal value of Eµ[¼(y(µ);µ) ¡ rA(y(µ);µA)] obtained
11with simultaneous communication which contradicts that the allocation rule equivalently
implements fyP(µ);tP(µ)g.
Second, I show that any limited-liability incentive rule that yields zero ex post payo®s
to the agent of type µA violates the principal's DSIC constraints. Since the agent gets
nothing in states (µP;µA) for every µP 2 £P, the principal obtains the surplus, namely
¼(yP(µP;µA);(µP;µA)), in those states. Since yP(µP;µA) < y¤(µP;µA) for every µP 2 £P,
then there exists a type ^ µP > µP such that ¼(yP(^ µP;µA);(µP;µA)) > ¼(yP(µP;µA);(µP;µA))
for any µP 2 £P, which implies that the principal prefers to send the message ^ µP rather
than revealing truthfully µP.10 ¤
Proposition 1 posits that, in the context of an informed principal-agent game with
an agent ex post participation constrained, there is no loss of e±ciency if communication
occurs sequentially if and only if the principal communicates ¯rst.
In the principal-agent model, the principal gets the ex ante surplus net of the agent's
expected informational rent. One way to achieve this ex ante payo® while satisfying the
agent's DSIC and ex post participation constraints is to assign to the agent his ex post
incremental gain of reporting truthfully his type (the term (a) of part (ii) in Lemma 2).
With such an allocation rule, the principal obtains the total surplus net of the agent's
informational rent not only at the ex ante but also at the interim stage. When sending
the message ^ µP, the principal selects a subset of decisions fyP(^ µP;µA)gµA2£A in the set
fyP(µ)g. She would obviously select the one that maximizes her interim payo® when of
type µP which is fyP(µP;µA)gµA2£A. She therefore reports truthfully her type µP. In other
words, the allocation rule is BIC for the principal.
On the other hand, to satisfy the agent's BIC and ex post participation constraints, the
limited-liability incentive rule must assign to the agent the incremental gain of reporting
truthfully his type at the interim stage, i.e., the term (a) of part (ii) in Lemma 1. The
principal gets the surplus net of this rent. She therefore obtains all the surplus when the
agent's type is µA. Since decisions are distorted downward (and assuming that the agent
10Notice that the argument holds for a measurable set around µA.
12reports truthfully µA), she prefers to report a higher type ex post.11 Hence, the incentive
allocation rule cannot be BIC for the agent, DSIC for the principal while assigning non-
negative payo®s to the agent.
For example, suppose that uP(y;µP) = (µP ¡ y)y and uA(y;µA) = ¡(® ¡ µA)y with
µP + µA > ® > ¹ µA. Suppose further that µA is uniformly distributed in £A. Then
¼(y;µ) = (µP + µA ¡ ® ¡ y)y is maximized at y¤(µP;µA) = 1
2(µP + µA ¡ ®). The prin-
cipal's maximization objective in (2) is (µP + 2µA ¡ ® ¡ ¹ µA ¡ y)y. It is maximized at
yP(µP;µA) = 1
2(µP + 2µA ¡ ® ¡ ¹ µA), which is strictly lower than y¤(µP;µA), except \at the
top" ¹ µA. To achieve the principal's ex ante payo® in the benchmark game while satisfying
the agent's BIC and ex post participation constraints, the agent of type µA's ex post payo®s
must be nil. It implies that the principal must obtain all surplus when the agent is of type
µA whatever her type is. If she communicates last, the principal chooses ^ µP that maxi-
mizes is ex post payo® ¼(yP(^ µP;µA);(µP;µA)) = 1
4(2µP ¡ ^ µP ¡®+ ¹ µA)(^ µP +2µA ¡®¡ ¹ µA).
Therefore, she reports ^ µP = µP + ¹ µA ¡ µA > µP for every µP 2 £P.
As a next step, I further investigate the informed principal-agent game, imposing non-
negative payo®s for the principal as well. It is easy to show that, if uA is concave in µA,
then the allocation rule fyP(µ);~ t(µ)g (which is de¯ned in (3) and (4)) assigns non-negative
ex post payo®s to the principal. Indeed, the principal obtains in state µ:






Since ¼(yP(µP;µA);(µP;µA)) ¸ 0 for every µP 2 £, all we have to show is that the right-
hand term in (5) is non-decreasing in µA. Di®erentiate (5) with respect to µA and use the





















(yP(µ);µA) · 0 for all µ 2 £.
11If her type is say µ
0













if it exists) in order to maximize the surplus which is also her payo®.
13Corollary 1 Suppose uA(y;:) is concave for any y 2 Y, then Proposition 1 also holds when
the principal's ex post payo®s are constrained to be non-negative.
Corollary 1 provides a clear link between communication order and bargaining power
when both players are treated similarly regarding ex post participation. It states that
sequential communication performs as well as simultaneous communication if and only if
the player who has bargaining power (the principal) moves ¯rst.
4 Equivalent implementation of limited-liability incentive rules
with sequential communication
In this section I examine the equivalent implementation of any limited-liability incentive
rule12, i.e. not only the one implemented in the principal-agent game. Indeed other limited-
liability incentive rules might be considered. For instance, a regulator might want to imple-
ment the ex post e±cient decisions fy¤(µ)g with a speci¯c divide of the (maximal) ex ante
surplus Eµ[¼(y¤(µ);µ)]. Suppose that this can be done with simultaneous communication.
Is it possible to rely on a (more decentralized) sequential mechanism?
Notice that, in this section, the \principal" refers to the player with unbounded ex post
payo®s. She is privately informed and does necessarily have all the bargaining power.
It is useful to show that the DSIC condition combined with the ex post participation con-
straints imposes speci¯c lower bounds on the agent's payo®. From (ii) in Lemma 2, taking









Integrating by parts the expectation with respect to µA in the ¯rst term yields, for all
µP 2 £P,
EµA[UA(y(µP;µA);t(µP;µA);µA)] = EµA[rA(y(µP;µA);µA)] + UA(y(µP;µA);t(µP;µA);µA):
12Recall that limited-liability incentive are allocation rules that are BIC for both players and satisfy ex
post participation for the agent.
14The ex post participation constraints require the second right-hand term to be non-negative,
therefore, for all µP 2 £P,
EµA[UA(y(µP;µA);t(µP;µA);µA)] ¸ EµA[rA(y(µP;µA);µA)]: (6)
The conditions (6) set lower bounds on the agent's shares of the surplus once µP is public
information (e.g. after that the principal has truthfully revealed her type µP when com-
municating ¯rst). Since the total surplus is divided among the two players (see (1)), these
conditions set upper bounds on the principal's interim payo®s, i.e., for all µP 2 £P,
EµA[UP(y(µP;µA);t(µP;µA);µP)] · EµA[¼(y(µP;µA);(µP;µA)) ¡ rA(y(µP;µA);µA)] (7)
Notice that, in the principal-agent game, (7) is binding for each µP. That is precisely
why the principal has an incentive to select the subset of decisions fyP(µP;µA)gµA2£A that
maximizes her interim payo®s, i.e. the right-hand side of (7), by communicating truthfully
her type µP. Yet it might not bind for other divides of the surplus.
It turns out that the above conditions (7) combined with condition (i) of Lemma 2 is not
only necessary but also su±cient for the equivalent implementation of an limited-liability
incentive rule when the principal moves ¯rst.13
Proposition 2 Under assumption (A1), a limited-liability incentive rule fy(µ);t(µ)g can
be equivalently implemented in a sequential mechanism in which the player with unbounded
ex post payo®s communicates ¯rst if and only if her interim payo® when of type µP does
not exceed EµA[¼(y(µP;µA);(µP;µA))¡rA(y(µP;µA);µA)] and y(µP;:) is non-decreasing for
all µP 2 £P.
Proof (If part) Consider a limited-liability incentive rule fy(µ);t(µ)g that satis¯es
Proposition 2's conditions. Consider further the following transfer scheme for every µ 2 £:







°(µP) ´ EµA[¼(y(µP;µA);(µP;µA)) ¡ rA(y(µP;µA);µA) ¡ UP(y(µP;µA);t(µP;µA);µP)]:
13I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out an error in a previous version of the paper.
15First, I show that fy(µ);t0(µ)g is BIC for the principal. Apply the expectation operator











Integrating by parts yields
EµA[UP(y(µP;µA);t0(µP;µA);µP)] = EµA[¼(y(µP;µA);(µP;µA))¡rA(y(µP;µA);µA)]¡°(µP):
Substitute for °(µP) and the last relationship simpli¯es to:
EµA[UP(y(µP;µA);t0(µP;µA);µP)] = EµA[UP(y(µP;µA);t(µP;µA);µP)]: (8)
Therefore, since fy(µ);t(µ)g is BIC for the principal, so is fy(µ);t0(µ)g.
Second, I show that fy(µ);t0(µ)g is DSIC for the agent. The agent obtains ex post in




(y(µP;x);x)dx + °(µP); (9)
which satis¯es condition (ii) in Lemma 2 with °(µP) = UA(y(µP;µA);t(µP;µA);µA) for
all µP 2 £P. Moreover, since y(µP;:) is non-decreasing by assumption, it also satis¯es
condition (i) in Lemma 2.
Third, the agent's ex post payo® in (9) is non-negative for all µ 2 £ because °(µP) is
non-negative for all µP 2 £P by assumption (see (7)).
Lastly, (8) shows that fy(µ);t0(µ)g yields the same interim payo® and, therefore, same
the ex ante payo® as the limited-liability incentive rule fy(µ);t(µ)g to the principal. Fur-
thermore, (8) combined with (1) yields for every µP 2 £P:
EµA[UA(y(µP;µA);t0(µP;µA);µA)] = EµA[UA(y(µP;µA);t(µP;µA);µA)]:
Applying the expectation operator over µP shows that fy(µ);t0(µ)g yields the same ex ante
payo® to the agent than fy(µ);t(µ)g.
(Only if part) The necessary conditions follow from condition (i) in Lemma 2 and the
implication of condition (ii) in Lemma 2 established in (6) and then (7). ¤
16The upper bounds (7) on the principal's interim payo®s might be an issue if the principal
has outside options at the interim stage. All sequential mechanisms (that equivalently
implement a limited-liability incentive rule) might fail to assign to the principal an interim
payo® higher than the bene¯ts from the outside options for some types µP. In contrast,
with simultaneous communication, the agent's BIC constraints are in expectation over µP
and, therefore, do not bound the agent's share of the surplus for any type µP.
I now close the paper with an example in which the conditions (7) might be a problem.
Assume that y is a level of pollution which yields a bene¯t uP(y;µP) to the producer but
causes an environmental damage ¡uA(y;µA) to an agent (e.g. the local population). The
producer compensates the agent for the environmental damage with a transfer t(µP;µA)
contingent to the bene¯t of pollution µP and its cost µA (both are private information). A
regulator wants to implement the ex post e±cient levels of pollution fy¤(µP;µA)g under the
\polluter pays principle" which obliges the producer to pay for the environmental damages.
This principle forces the agent's ex post payo®s to be non-negative. Furthermore, suppose
that the producer has an outside option to produce elsewhere with a bene¯t denoted uP(µP).
The regulator wants also to avoid this delocalization. The ex post e±cient levels might
be implementable with a direct revelation mechanism (while satisfying the polluter pays
principle and the producer's interim participation constraints) but not with a sequential
mechanism if uP(µP) > EµA[¼(y¤(µP;µA);(µP;µA)) ¡ rA(y¤(µP;µA);µA)] for a measurable
set of types µP. That is if the producer's outside option sometimes exceeds the total surplus
net of the agent's informational rent at the interim stage.
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